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REGULATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS:
FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES*
IVAN C. RUTLEDGEt
INTRODUCTION
Wartime mobilization of manpower included the traditional
drastic process of conscription for military service, and it laid
hold upon lesser expedients for civilians. Among them was the
importation of foreign workers under contract to serve on the
farms and in the factories. This expedient, though practiced
on a smaller scale in the First World War, constituted a depar-
ture from the usual peacetime methods of obtaining additions to
the labor force, and initiated a practice of importation of farm
labor under contract that has persisted to the present day.
This practice of supplementing the domestic labor force with
temporary 'employees from abroad raises questions about the
labor system of the United States as it has developed since the
abolition of the slave system in the South and the curtailment of
massive immigration from Europe. Among these questions is:
what is the extent of the freedom to migrate for employment
under the law of the United States?
Free mobility of persons inheres in the political atmosphere
of the United States. Not as workingmen or farmers but as
*Chinese or Negroes have people been condemned to a certain
quarter of town or excluded from the city limits; and the victims
of such aberrations from the general policy are minorities, almost
by definition. Nevertheless there are, of course, many limitations
upon mobility, notwithstanding the great development of trans-
portation facilities. In addition to personal, social, or economic
conditions that may hold a worker to his locality or prevent his
movement to some other place, there are legal determinations
that prescribe or permit the erection of barriers to his changing
of location. Among these determinations, the subject of discus-
sion is confined to regulatory norms, or those that authorize
the application of physical coercion for their vindication. It does
* This article is the first of two articles by Professor Rutledge on this sub-
ject. The second one will be published in the June, 1953, issue of the Wash-
ington University Law Quarterly.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
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not extend to governmental action that takes effect upon the
mobility of persons through, the compulsion or influence of eco-
nomic advantage or disadvantage. For example, it would be
afield from this study to examine the law of public contracts,
though there may be aspects of policies in force that determine
shifts of laborers from one place to another. The focus of in-
terest is the legal right to go or stay.
Migration controls of this direct order include as their sub-
jects a variety of kinds of migrants: persons seeking to settle
land, to trade, to pursue adventure or recreation, or other ends.
The emphasis will here be placed upon controls designed to apply
to laborers as such, so far as such controls can be distinguished
from the regulation of migration in general or regulation for
purposes unrelated to the size and distribution of the labor force.
Migration for employment thus describes the subject of the
regulatory controls to be explored. The object of the exploration
is to identify the limitations upon freedom of mobility thus
imposed.
Migration for employment involves a variety of interests that
receive some degree of legal protection. On the one hand it is
an expression of the aspiration of a worker to improve his oppor-
tunities, and a mechanism for distribution of workers where they
are most needed. On the other, it may produce the disruption of
stable productive relationships or the concentration of an over-
supply of applicants for the available jobs under existing eco-
nomic organization and resources in the locality. In general,
the legal protections accorded these and related economic in-
terests arise from a variety of constitutional, common law, and
statutory principles. But the most conspicuous are the prohibition
of slavery and involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment at one pole, and at the other, the power to conscript man-
power to protect the safety of the republic.
The extent of freedom to migrate for employment and the
legal protection accorded to it are explored as they relate to
migration within the boundaries of the United States. The pur-
pose of this essay is to describe the basic constitutional norms to
which controls upon internal movement of workers must con-
form and to provide a measuring-rod for calculation of policy
concerning supplementation of the labor force from abroad.
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I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
If it is true that most people who migrate for employment
leave another employment to do so, limitations on freedom to
leave are intimately related to freedom to migrate for employ-
ment. Slavery and indentured servitude are illustrations of a
happily obsolete legal relationship that bound the worker to his
job. As institutions their legal sanction was abolished by the
Thirteenth Amendment:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.
The influence of the Northwest Ordinance' was exhibited in
an 1821 decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana that involun-
tary servitude is prohibited though it is voluntarily undertaken
by the servant. 2 In that case the servant had voluntarily bound
herself to serve her master as a housemaid for twenty years.
During the term she sought release by habeas corpus. The court
discharged her from custody, correcting the error of the lower
court, on tle ground that to enforce her contract in specie would
produce involuntary servitude in violation of the constitution. An
exception to the general principle against specific enforcement of
contracts for personal service was recognized in the case of
apprenticeship indentures, on the basis of the duty of the child
to obey his parents or the master, regarded as in loco parentis.
The court also recognized exceptions to the prohibition of in-
voluntary servitude as a matter of "national policy" where
soldiers and sailors are compelled to serve.
This opinion contains examples of two of the main lines of
tendency in legal controversy and development following the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. When can service be
compelled regardless of the consent of the person? What com-
pulsions can be applied to enforce an obligation to continue
service entered into voluntarily?
1. "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.... ." Art. 6, Articles of Compact, Ordinance
of Congress, Northwest Territorial Government, as quoted in 1 IND. ANN.
STAT.'288, 292 (Burns 1933).
2. The case of Mary Clark, a woman of color, 1 Blackf. 1222 (Ind. 1821).
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Massachusetts went further than Indiana and held that a con-
tract for employment as a servant, though voluntarily made,
was wholly void where it provided that the "customary freedom
dues" would be paid at the end of the term.3 However, in addi-
tion to this provision for freedom dues, the court was moved to
characterize the contract as one for involuntary servitude be-
cause its terms were so indefinite that no rate of compensation
(except the initial consideration of ten dollars paid at the making
of the contract) was stipulated, no description of the nature of
the services was agreed, nor was it stipulated to whom the ser-
vices were to be rendered. A half century later, the Georgia
Court of Appeals was not so sensitive about a contract involving,
but not in terms or legal effect requiring, the personal services
of one Dews, not a party to the contract. Dews had been re-
leased on bond to his attorney pending a grand jury charge of
murder. The attorney had furnished security for the bond. Dews
had made notes to his attorney totalling $272.00 and had agreed
to work for him or at his direction. By the contract in question
the attorney had sold part of the notes to another for $112.00,
and the buyer had also agreed to purchase most of the remainder
for $113.00 if the jury failed to indict or the indictment was not
prosecuted. The contract also provided that Dews would work
for the buyer of the notes, and he would deliver Dews in case
of an indictment or pay the $113.00 anyway. The attorney
promised to remain bound for the appearance of Dews. The
terms and recitals of the contract reflected the foregoing situa-
tion. Dews was killed before the grand jury convened, and the
attorney sued for the balance of $113.00. The contract was en-
forced.4 As the court interpreted it, Dews was not bound to in-
voluntary servitude, there was no evidence that he was unwill-
ing to work or that he should be forced to work, and the provi-
sion for the buyer to deliver Dews meant only that he would not
obstruct his appearance. The Massachusetts case, however,
was an action for enticing the servant from her employment
and was thus more closely connected in its outcome with the
freedom to leave an employment than the Georgia case.
The effect of the Thirteenth Amendment on a contracLof-ser-
vice entered into voluntarily was reflected within tvo years
:i. Parsons v. Trask, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 473 (1856).
4. Potts v. Riddle, 5 Ga. App. 378, 63 S.E. 253 (1908).
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after ratification, in a case that counsel asserted would affect
the condition of "thousands" of Negro minors "whose term of
slavery had been protracted from five to ten years by this illegal
mode of apprenticing them."5 The mode of apprenticing them
so described was put into effect November 3, 1864, two days
after the new Maryland constitution, with a prohibition against
slavery and involuntary servitude, had gone into effect. It con-
sisted of a round-up of the freedmen of the county, where the
younger persons were bound as apprentices to their late masters.
These indentures recited that the parents entered into the agree-
ment freely, and there was no specific evidence to the contrary.
However these bonds described the child as "a property and an
interest" and discriminated in their terms as compared with
the forms used for white apprentices: the Negro could be trans-
ferred to any master in the county, whereas the white was bound
to a single master for the entire term; and the white was entitled
to instruction in the three R's.
Chief Justice Chase, on circuit in Maryland, held that the
petitioner should be released from custody of her master. He
relied upon the Thirteenth Amendment and a provision in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. 7 This provision anticipated the Four-
teenth Amendment in defining United States citizenship, and it
employed the language of equal protection in guaranteeing to
all citizens of every race and color the same right "to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security of the
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.",, In short,
the apprenticeship was involuntary servitude prohibited by the
Thirteenth Amendment and the legislation thereunder.
The so-called Civil Rights Acts have not yet shed the odium
of their origin. It is said to be "familiar history that much of
this legislation was born of that vengeful spirit which to no
small degree envenomed the Reconstruction era. ' D Even at the
time, doubt about the extent of legislative power granted Con-
gress under the Thirteenth Amendment contributed to the pro-
5. Inre Turner, 24 Fed. Cas. 337, 339, No. 14,247 (C.C.D. Md. 1867).
6. Ibid.
7. Approved April 9, (1866), 14 STAr. 27. The purpose of the Act was to
outlaw the "Black Codes," though here it was applied to action of a private
or at least semi-private character. In its present abbreviated form it ap-
pears as a provision for equality with white citizens in the ownership and
right to acquire property. See 8 U.S.C. § 42 (1946).
8. Ibid.
9. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (1945).
FORCED LABOR
posal of the Fourteenth.,, Subsequent legislation in terms very
similar to the Act of 1866 was struck down as unconstitutional."
The Negro workmen involved in the case so deciding were not
being held to service; on the contrary, the defendants were in-
dicted for conspiring to prevent them from performing their
contracts to work in a lumber camp. The court held that the
statute exceeded the authority of Congress. As to the Thirteenth
Amendment, interference with employment does not impose
involuntary servitude; and as to the Fourteenth, only private
conduct and not state action was involved. A similar fate had
earlier met other acts of Congress designed to wipe out the
residues of slavery. Senator Trumbull, chairman of the Judiciary
Committee said: "It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot
go and come at pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who cannot
enforce his rights."2 But Congress acted unconstitutionally
when it provided a remedy in federal courts against barring
persons from hotels, theaters, or railway accommodations be-
cause of their color.1 The act was not directed exclusively
against state action, so was outside the authority of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The conduct forbidden by the act does not,
in spite of senatorial rhetoric, amount to slavery under the
Thirteenth Amendment.
2. THE ANTI-PEONAGE ACT
Early Interpretations
But what was to prove the most important legislation for the
prevention of involuntary servitude escaped the force of the
10. A history of this doubt as reflected in Congressional debates is argu-
mentatively presented in TEN BROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS Or THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT C. 10 (1951). In FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 95 (1908), it is said:
It cannot fairly be said, however, as was charged by some of the de-
bate, that the men who supported the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment thereby acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the Civil
Rights Bill, thus stultifying themselves, for it is quite possible that a
man may be practically certain in his own mind that a measure is con-
stitutional and yet may fear that the Courts will take a different view
of it.
11. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). The invalid section pro-
vided that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
Act of May 31, 1870, § 16, 16 STAT. 140, 144.
12. CoNG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
13. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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restrictive interpretation of powers of Congress under the Civil
War Amendments, though it was a part of Reconstruction. The
Anti-Peonage Act of March 2, 1867, punishes as a felony hold-
ing, arresting or returning any person "to a condition of peon-
a g e. ,14
This statute was at first narrowly construed by a trial judge,
It was held to apply only to cases where the contract to labor
was made voluntarily and not to extend to any state where no
system of peonage was in effect.'1 A technical holding the other
way on the question of a system of peonage said that the indict-
ment need only follow the statutory language, without alleging
a system of peonage.' 6 One trial judge, after denying that a
system had to be shown, in his opinion sustaining an indictment,
paid his respects to the contention in acid terms. He observed
that the defendants, a sheriff and a lawyer, had the active sup-
port during the proceedings of the chairman of the state senate
penitentiary committee, a member of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in Congress from their district, and the state's attorney.
He found this phenomenon "somewhat persuasive of the con-
clusion that if there is no system of peonage de jure, to which
the statute applies, there is yet a de facto system of some equiva-
lent sort, which has evoked the liveliest apprehension of those
who participate in its operations and emoluments, and of others
whose sentiments toward it are not wholly antipathetic."' 1
The basis for the position that would require a system of
peonage was the fact that the statute singled out New Mexico,
though it added "any other Territory or State of the United
States," and the first sentence made unlawful "the holding o
any person to service or labor under the system known as
peonage."'18
It seems clear that Mexican peonage was the particular mis-
chief the act was intended to reach. Although peons were
being released on habeas corpus by the federal courts in New
14. The Act now appears as 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (Supp. III, 1950).
15. The district judge, apparently by judicial notice, found that no system
of peonage had ever existed in Georgia and sustained the demurrer to the
indictment. United States v. Eberhart, 127 Fed. 252 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1899).
16. In Te Lewis, 114 Fed. 963 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1902).
17. United States. v. McClellan, 127 Fed. 971, 973 (S.D. Ga. 1904).
18. 14 STAT. 546, § 2 (1867). This statute now appears without the pro-
vision which singled out New Mexico, at REv. STAT. § 1990 (1875), 8 U.S.C.
§ 56 (1946).
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Mexico, few were applying for release, and officers of the United
States Army were assisting the masters to "arrest" and "return"
fleeing peons to servitude. This condition is reflected in the
provisions of the original act that any officer or other person in
the military service in the Territory of New Mexico who should
in any way interfere with its enforcement should be dishonorably
discharged.'
At least two grand jury charges described the situation in
New Mexico. One of them explained that peonage presents
political problems that slavery does not, because peons may be
voters. That means, it was explained, that men of large wealth
could gradually obtain control of hosts of voters, either through
their ignorance or their poverty.20 The other charge took up a
natural rights explanation: "One of the most valuable liberties
of man is to work where he pleases, and to quit one employment
and go to another, subject, of course, to civil liability for breach
of contract obligations. ' ' 21 This charge was in the form of re-
sponses to questions which the judge said the grand jury had
been asking for some time about peonage and involuntary servi-
tude laws. Two years later, in 1905, questions about the Anti-
Peonage Law first received an answer from the Supreme Court.
The Basic Construction
The case was Clyatt v. United States. 22 First, the act was
"appropriate legislation" under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Second: "Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or in-
voluntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of
origin, but none in the character of the servitude... . But peon-
age, however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servi-
tude."''- So far, the opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer takes the
act over the hurdle of federalism and interprets the act to cover
service entered voluntarily as well as involuntarily. Moreover,
there is no requirement that the condition of peonage be part of
a system. The evidence was simply that the defendant pursued
19. 14 STAT. 546, § 2 (1867).
20. Peonage Cases, 136 Fed. 707 (E.D. Ark. 1905).
21. Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 686 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
22. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
23. Id. at 215.
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his employee to Florida, where he procured his arrest on a charge
of larceny and returned him to Georgia to work out a debt.
The first limitation upon the use of the act as a protection
against involuntary servitude did not operate in this case. That
limitation arises from an interpretation of "peonage" in the
light of history. It is "a status or condition of compulsory ser-
vice, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.
The basal fact is indebtedness. '124 Another limitation resulted in
a remand for a new trial on the ground that there was no evi-
dence of a condition of peonage prior to the arrest. To arrest or
return one to a condition of peonage, said the court, there must
be evidence of a pre-existing condition in which the employee is
compelled to serve, no matter that he is by compulsion held for
return to service. While the meaning of a criminal statute
should not be too much enlarged against the accused, so limited
an interpretation as this does violence to the term "peonage."
It in effect holds that the requisite condition of peonage must
be even more closely related to compulsory service than is in-
voluntary confinement for the purpose of returning one to seI->
vice. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented from the order granting a
new trial on the ground. that this point had not been raised by
the defendant at the trial and for the further reason that the
evidence showed that the conduct of defendant was within the
fair meaning of the statute.
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent gained acceptance in 1944, when
Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for a majority of the Supreme
Court, held that it is unnecessary for the indictment to allege
that the victim was in a condition of peonage. 25 The statute con-
demns holding, arresting, or returning to a condition of peonage.
The Court admitted that because of use of the preposition "to"
the statute was ungrammatically and too compactly phrased. It
is not necessary, however, that the condition of peonage be
actually achieved if there is the compulsion applied with intent
to bring it about. Each of three separate acts is condemned:
holding a person in a condition of peonage; arresting a person
for the purpose of placing him in such condition; and returning
him to such a condition. The Clyatt case may still stand for the
proposition that if the accusation is returning one to a condition
24. Ibid.
25. United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944).
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of peonage, it must be proved that the victim had formerly
been so held; but no condition of peonage has to be shown to
exist if the indictment charges an arrest.26
Methods of Peonage
Private force and abuse of process. The means by which the
master holds the servant to work out his indebtedness has not
been closely examined in cases where the constitutionality of a
state statute was not involved. In most of the cases of this kind
selected for prosecution the means were undoubtedly the use
of force such as locking men up, whipping them, or threatening
to kill or maim them.2 7 The Clyatt case illustrates another
method used, the abuse of process for arrest on a criminal charge
such as vagrancy. A combination of these methods was ex-
hibited in a case arising in Florida in 1926. The defendant was
an operator of turpentine farms. The victims voltintarily went
to work for him, from all that appears. Two weeks later they
obtained permission to leave the camp and bring back the family
of one of the victims, but they did not return. Defendant em-
ployer obtained their arrest on a charge of larceny of $8.50.
When they were taken before the magistrate, the defendant told
them with the apparent approval of the magistrate that they
would be imprisoned for eight months unless they pleaded guilty.
They did. Their release was ordered on payment of costs, which
defendant furnished. He then took them back to his camp by
fear of physical punishment and further criminal prosecution.
They escaped seven weeks later, but were forcibly recaptured,
26. Mr. Justice Murphy was of opinion that the language of the statute
failed to give a fair warning that arrest with intention to make another a
peon would be penalized, apparently overlooking the general doctrine that
action beyond "mere preparation" with intent to commit a substantive of-
fence is a criminal attempt. The general revision and enactment of Title 18
into positive law in 1948 straightened out the language by penalizing who-
ever "holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage, or arrests any
person with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a condition of
peonage." 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (Supp. 1951).
27. Brutality is not essential, but force or intimidation, not mere per-
uasion to stay and get the debt paid, must be used. United States v.
Clement, 171 Fed. 974 (D.S.C. 1909). In a charge to the grand jury it was
stated that cases of "woods riders" and forcible and illegal arrest without
color of law were obvious cases. The judge was especially concerned that the
peonage in the district had included a "respectable white man and his wife
in one instance, and in another a white boy of good parentage." In re
Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686 (C.C.N.D. Fla. 1905).
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whipped, and kept under guard at their work. Defendant was
convicted under all three phases of the statute.28
A Mexican alien was kept as a maid-of-all-work in a San
Antonio bawdy -house by threats to turn her over to immigration
officers who (she was told) would put her in jail for five years.
The court held that the means of coercion was sufficient, so long
as it held her against her will and made her work to satisfy an
asserted claim of indebtedness. 20
Compulsory service statutes. The pressure to keep men in an
employment may produce legislation which combined with pri-
vate action brings about peonage. In 1910 the Supreme Court
had upheld a statute that, in punishing embezzlement, provided
for remission of part of the sentence upon restoration of the
funds taken. 0 Four years later, an Alabama statute more di-
rectly related to the problem came before the Court. That statute
prescribed a procedure by which a convict who was sentenced
to pay a fine could avoid imprisonment though he was unable
to pay the fine. The procedure was for him to obtain a surety
who with him would "confess judgment" for the amount of the
fine and costs. He and the surety would then enter into a sepa-
rate contract under which the convict would agree to work for
the surety to satisfy the amount paid the state by the surety.
The statute gave the surety a remedy for breach of this contract,
as follows: the violator of the contract could be arrested, brought
before the court, and fined again, not to exceed $500.00, but
within that amount, not less than the damages suffered by the
surety, and those damages as assessed by a jury were to be paid
to the surety.
United States v. Reynolds31 shows the operation of the pro-
cedure under the state statute. One Rivers was convicted of
larceny and fined $15.00 plus $43.75 costs. Reynolds appeared
as surety for Rivers and judgment by confession was entered
against them for the total of $58.75, which Reynolds paid.
28. Davis v. United States, 12 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271
U.S. 688 (1926). A sordid episode of compulsory prostitution was revealed
in a case where a roadhouse operator had obtained two of the girls from the
penitentiary by paying their fines. With four others they were kept in-
communicado and held by threats of violence. Pierce v. United States, 146
F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945).
29. Bernal v. United States, 241 Fed. 339 (5th Cir. 1917).
30. Freeman v. United States, 217 U.S. 539 (1910). No contention was
based on the Thirteenth Amendment.
31. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
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Rivers agreed to work for Reynolds as a farm hand for nine
months and twenty-four days at the rate of six dollars a month,
or a total wage for the term of approximately $58.75. He worked
a month and two days when, though threatened with arrest and
imprisonment, he quit. So Reynolds had him arrested and he
was convicted of violating the contract of service. The fine was
one cent plus $87.05 costs. Apparently he was deeper in the
hole by about $36.00, which seems to have been the damage
suffered by Reynolds from the breach of contract. Broughton
became a new surety for Rivers and "hired" him for fourteen
months and fifteen days (a rate of six dollars a month). Brough-
ton also became employer of Fields, by paying his fine for selling
mortgaged property. In that instance the fine was $50.00 plus
$69.70 costs, which made a term of one day less than twenty
months.
The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Day, held that
coercion by criminal penalties that produce constant fear of
imprisonment renders service compulsory, as much so as if the
employer were himself directly given authority to arrest and
hold the person of the laborer. The statutory scheme was held
unconstitutional, and and the defendants were put to trial.
Mr. Justice Holmes wrote a concurring opinion in which
he said:
There seems to me nothing in the Thirteenth Amendment
or the Revised Statutes that prevents a State from making
a breach of contract, as well a reasonable contract for labor
as for other matters, a crime and punishing it as such....
The successive contracts, each for a longer term than the
last, are the inevitable, and must be taken to have been the
contemplated outcome of the Alabama laws. On this ground
I am inclined to agree that the statutes in question disclose
the attempt to maintain service that the Revised Statutes
forbid.12
The case in effect draws a line between a system under which
the convict is theoretically free to work out his fine under a
private employer, instead of serving a jail sentence, and the
notorious convict leasing system. It may be surmised that the
choice of making a contract to work for a private employer was
almost illusory, with the convict being "invited" to sign a con-
fession of judgment with a "helpful" offer of suretyship, and
with the rate of service in the lock-up much lower than under
32. 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914).
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the "contract." However, the Court concentrated upon the fact
that leaving the service of the private employer was a crime.
By comparison, under the convict leasing system the convict
was in fact a prisoner,33 rather than merely under threat of
criminal punishment, and in addition was criminally liable for
escaping. On the other hand, perhaps the leasing of convicts
does not so lend itself to maintaining service beyond the term
set in the sentence as the scheme condemned in the Reynolds
case.
Although Mr. Justice Holmes joined the majority on what he
saw as the contemplated outcome of the Alabama laws, he had
earlier dissented from condemnation of a statute that could
conceivably be used to keep a laborer on the job under threat
of criminal prosecution. Joined by Mr. Justice Lurton, he wrote
a minority opinion asserting the proposition that the perform-
ance of a contract for personal service can lawfully be sanctioned
by criminal liability. He saw no relation between enforcement
of a fair and proper contract even by imprisonment and giving
authority to a private master to use private force to keep a
laborer from quitting.34
False pretense statutes. The nearest approximation to a
statute enforcing performance of a contract for labor by criminal
sanctions found in this study is an enactment of South Carolina
in 1897.35 The statute made it a misdemeanor to fail to perform
a contract to do farm labor or work a crop "on shares" after
obtaining advances of money or supplies from the farmer or
lessor. The failure had to be wilful and without just cause. This
statute was at first sustained against an attack on the grounds
of arbitrary discrimination against sharecroppers and farm
laborers and denial of equal protection, with the dour explana-
tion that laborers never make advances to landholders.3 Seven
years later, however, it was held to violate the Thirteenth and
33. See CUMMINGS AND McFARLAND, FEDERAL JusTicE 354-355 (1937); 2
ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, SEN. Doc. No.
747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 444 (1910). A convict is not a slave, and contracting
between the state and private persons for the labor of convicts has been held
to be lawfully authorized, notwithstanding the Thirteenth Amendment. An-
derson v. Salant, 38 R.I. 463, 96 Atl. 425 (1916). Richard B. Morris de-
scribes historical antecedents of "the county jail as an employment bureau
for cheap labor" in an article on Delaware bondage. Morris, Nhe Course of
Peonage in a Slave State, 65 POL. ScI. Q. 238 (1950).
34. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
35. S.C. LAws 1897, p. 457.
36. State v. Chapman, 56 S.C. 420, 34 S.E. 961 (1900).
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Fourteenth Amendments, 7 and in the following year the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina held it unconstitutional.3 8 The
court read the statute as applicable to obtaining advances hon-
estly and ruled out the possibility that it was intended only to
punish fraud. The court observed that the main purpose of the
Thirteenth Amendment was to prohibit any form of involuntary
service by agricultural laborers, especially Negro laborers in the
South. The court asserted that there is no significant distinction
between compelling service by making it a crime to leave it and
authorizing an employer to station guards to prevent his work-
men from walking off. The statute goes further than mere peon-
age in that it fails to give the laborer the alternatives of con-
tinuing work or paying the debt.3 9 This court also found a
denial of equal protection in two aspects, one, of burdening one
party to a contract with heavier sanctions upon performance
than the other, and the second, of making an arbitrary distinc-
tion between the liabilities of employees who obtain or receive
advances and those who do not.
Alabama employers had at their disposal a statute in addition
to the statutory scheme of "confession of judgment" for a fine
that was outlawed in the Reynolds case. It differed from the
South Carolina statute in that the advances had to be fraudu-
lently obtained with intent to injure the employer, but leaving
the job without repaying the advances was prima facie evidence
of intention to defraud and injure.40 By court-made rule the
laborer's testimony of his uncommunicated motive, that is, that
he did not intend to defraud, was inadmissible. The fine to be
imposed was measured by the amount of damage to the employer,
which was doubled, up to a maximum of $300.00, and half of
that amount was paid to the employer. This statute was chal-
37. Ex parte Drayton, 153 Fed. 986 (D.S.C. 1907).
38. Ex parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19 (1908).
39. A statute that gave the worker such an alternative was first sustained,
then held invalid. La. Laws 1906, No. 54. In the first case it was construed
as permitting the laborer to escape liability by showing that he obtained
the advances in good faith. State v. Murray, 116 La. 655, 40 So. 930 (1906).
The opinion in the case that invalidated the statute went squarely on the
proposition that if service is enforceable by criminal prosecution it is peon-
age, though entered into by contract. State v. Oliva, 144 La. 51, 80 So. 195
(1918).
40. Cf. the construction given to the Louisiana statute in State v. Murray,
note 39, supra. The Alabama statutory presumption was upheld against
the contention that it usurped the powers of the courts. State v. Thomas,
144 Ala. 77,40 So. 271 (1906).
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lenged in Bailey v. Alabama.41 The United States as amicus
curiae argued:
The statute hits especially, as was intended, Negro
laborers on farms and plantations. Every reported case
under the statute is that of a farm laborer. The maximum
penalty fixed by the statute, $300.00, also makes it peculiarly
applicable to this class of laborers .... 42
Mr. Justice Hughes, for the Court, went to some pains to make
clear that the case had to be approached in the same way,
whether it arose in Alabama or Maine. But the state cannot
use the criminal law to compel the performance of contracts for
labor any more than it can authorize the use of physical force
for that purpose. This prohibition is trangressed by the pre-
sumption of intention to defraud, which makes the act a con-
venient instrument of coercion by threat of criminal prosecution.
As indicated above,43 the two dissenters did not agree with the
initial premise that the criminal law cannot be used to compel
labor in accordance with a contractual obligation. But they went
further and defended this statute as one merely for the punish-
ment of fraud. With such a characterization the conclusion
followed easily that it can be made a crime to obtain money or
goods by false pretenses, just as larceny or murder is criminal.
The dissenting opinion said that the statutory presumption
did not go much further than the common law. That is, one who
obtains goods on the faith that he will work until his wages
amount to their price, but fails to work, intends to get the goods
without working or paying for them. But in the case at bar
the laborer was convicted because after working a month or a
little more on a one-year contract he quit, leaving a debt of about
thirteen dollars. The agreed rate of pay was twelve dollars a
month, but he received a fifteen dollar advance, with the agree-
ment that his pay would then be $10.75 a month. (His fine was
41. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
42. Id. at 222, 223. As an argument based on the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it may be supposed that one South Carolinajudge might have been inclined to meet it with an answer that the classifica-
tion was reasonable. In United States v. Clement, 171 Fed. 974 (D.S.C.
1909), Brawley, J., stated, with reference to the opinion "that the negro will
not work unless he is forced to work . . .," that "[t]here is something to be
said in favor of that view." Id. at 979. But the same judge instructed thejury that character testimony from a witness who felt no sense of abhor-
rence at the crime of peonage would not tend to any presumption of the
defendant's innocence.
43. Text cited to note 34 supra.
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thirty dollars, to be worked out by a jail sentence at the rate of
about twenty-two cents a day.) It does not seem by any means
clear that a presumption arises that he never intended to repay
the advance and intended to quit before the end of the year
when he obtained the fifteen dollars.
The opinion in the Bailey case seems to make it clear that the
employer cannot by statute be given an advantage in enforcing
his contract of employment by becoming at the same time the
creditor of his employee, not even to the extent of a presumption
that the debt was fraudulently contracted, if the debt is not paid
and the work is not done. It is as though the employer and the
creditor were different persons. A statute was, however, held
valid in Georgia that punished as cheating and swindling the
obtaining of goods or money by contracting with another to
perform services for him with no intention to perform the ser-
vices. This statute went further and, like the Alabama statute,
made refusal to perform the services prima facie evidence of
the intent not to perform them when the contract was made or
the advances obtained. But the Georgia court had held that the
statute punished fraud, not mere breach of contract.44 After the
decision in the Bailey case this position was no longer tenable,
but in the same year the Georgia court held the first part of the
statute separable from the presumption section, as an act merely
punishing the obtaining of money or goods by deceit.45 The
court, however, did not hold the presumption section invalid
because the case did not involve its application.
The court showed an inclination to distinguish the Bailey case
and uphold the Georgia statute in its entirety, on the ground
that the Alabama judge-made rule withheld from the laborer
any practicable means of rebutting the presumption. That is,
since he could not testify that he had no intention to defraud,
the presumption in practical effect was conclusive, and the
statute really punished breach of contract. Not until 1942 was
this somewhat factitious doubt about the scope of the Bailey
holding resolved. In Taylor v. Georgia,"4 defendant agreed to
work at manual labor for $1.25 a day until he had earned $19.50.
His employer loaned him $19.50, whereupon the "would-not-be"
employee failed either to pay his debt or to do the work. The
44. Townsend v. State, 124 Ga. 69, 52 S.E. 293 (1905).
45. Latson v. Wells, 136 Ga. 681, '71 S.E. 1052 (1911).
46. 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
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statute in its entirety was applied in his case and resulted in a
conviction. Mr. Justice Byrnes, for the Court, held that so far
as the Thirteenth Amendment and legislation thereunder are
concerned, no distinction can be made between punishment for
breach of a contract to labor and punishment for fraud in making
the contract, when that fraud is established by a presumption
that is based upon the subsequent breach. Both would be invalid
impositions of involuntary servitude.47
Pollock v. Williams,4 8 decided two years later, recites the his-
tory of even greater reluctance in Florida than in Georgia to
abandon the presumption. Three times after courts had held
the presumption to be unconstitutional the legislature had re-
enacted statutes that contained it. In the case that finally
reached the Supreme Court, the laborer had pleaded guilty;
hence the presumption was not invoked against him. Mr. Justice
Jackson, writing the opinion of the Court, was unimpressed.
Although the presumption section is severable and the punish-
ment-for-fraud section alone would be valid, the statute laid its
undivided weight on the laborer. The scruples of Mr. Justice
Hughes to avoid sectionalism in the Bailey case were not carried
so far in this case as to prevent judicial knowledge of the uses
to which such a statute, though partially invalid, was put. The
cleanest case, the Court said, was one where the Negro would
borrow but would not work and nothing more was involved. But
the issue of freedom is at stake:
The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as
supplemented by the Antipeonage Act was not merely to
end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and
voluntary labor throughout the United States. Forced labor
in some special circumstances may be consistent with the
general basic system of free labor. For example, forced
labor has been sustained as a means of punishing crime, and
there are duties such as work on highways which society
may compel. But in general the defense against oppressive
hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment is the right to
change employers. When the master can compel and the
47. The Alabama court had earlier grasped the significance of the Bailey
case. In a prosecution for enticing a farm laborer from his employment, it
was error to admit evidence that the employee owed money when he left,
because it was irrelevant; to force him to stay and work out the balance
claimed to be due would be involuntary servitude. Holland v. State, 29 Ala.
App. 181, 194 So. 412 (1940).
48. 322 U.S. 4 (1944). The problem continues. United States v. Casa
Lonzo Walker, S.D. Miss., Dec. 7, 1949, REP. ATT'y GEN. 239 (1950)
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laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no
power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a
harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.
Resulting depression of working conditions and living
standards affects not only the laborer under the system, but
every other with whom his labor comes in competition....
Congress has put it beyond debate that no indebtedness
warrants a suspension of the right to be free from com-
pulsory service. This congressional policy means that no
state can make the quitting of work any component of a
crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding un-
willing persons to labor.49
There was a dissent written by Mr. Justice Reed, in which
Mr. Chief Justice Stone joined. Its basis was the need for proof
that the presumption section coerced labor by the fear of con-
viction under the substantive section. They would not indulge in
judicial knowledge of how the statute-book would actually
operate in Florida, following the same idea of disregard for
geography as that expressed in the Bailey case.
The federal power to protect against peonage operates in two
ways. The simile of the shield and the sword is apposite. As a
shield the federal power can be invoked to protect the individual
against legislation or executive action by a state that enforces
or contributes to peonage. The cases outlined above show how
in this century the Supreme Court has broadened the area into
which a state is forbidden to step in response to the demands of
employers for leverage against idleness or, say, a preference for
an eight-hour day over the vicissitudes of farm work. To sum-
marize, a state may not confer upon an employer the power to
keep a laborer on his job by making it a crime to leave the
employment. This prohibition extends to cases in which the
employee has obtained advances whether in the form of pay-
ment of a fine or otherwise, on the promise of working for the
49. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17, 18 (1944). However the method
of carrying out the course of employment may be controlled by mandatory
injunction or agency order so long as the employment continues. Inter-
national Union, U.A.W.A. v. Wis. Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
245 (1949); Delorme v. Int. Bartenders' Union, 18 Wash. 2d 444, 139 P.2d
619 (1943). A provision has been held invalid that made it a misdemeanor
for an employee to refuse to handle material because produced, processed, or
delivered by non-union workers. It was held to infringe "closely" on the
Thirteenth Amendment. Ala. State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246
Ala. 21, 18 So.2d 826 (1944), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450 (1945). See, on
the question of the power of a state to forbid a strike, Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron Co., 335 U.S. 525, 528, 529 (1948).
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employer. Nor may the fact of leaving employment be made
presumptive evidence of intention to defraud in obtaining such
advances, where obtaining them deceitfully is a crime. And
finally, the mere existence of provision for such a presumption
on the statute books, though regarded as separable and not form-
ally enforced, renders unconstitutional the other provisions that
purport to make it a crime to obtain money or goods by fraudu-
lently promising to work for another.
Statutes subject to abuse. The obvious next step in demarking
freedom to leave an employment has not yet been taken. That
would be to hold that it cannot be made a crime, though it is a
civil wrong, to obtain advances deceitfully by a promise to work
without intention to do so. Such a statute could be an instrument
of abuse in the hands of employers, but so is the general law
against theft. Certainly the more specific the class of persons
subject to such a statute, the closer its connection with peonage.
Even aside from abusive application to produce peonage in a
particular instance, a statute drawn to cover a particular class
of laborers should be considered (in addition to any question
about the reasonableness of the classification under the Four-
teenth Amendment) as intended to be used for peonage. ° Even
if a fraudulent promise to work, made to obtain advances against
future pay, can under a system of free labor be made criminal,
it seems contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment to furnish em-
ployers with the advantage of a statute directed at a particular
kind of labor, when the persons charged under such a statute are
unlikely to be able to prevent its oppressive use through proper
legal representation. 51 It must be conceded, however, that the
Pollock case does not quite go so far as to cast substantial doubt
50. In addition to the statutes applicable only to share croppers and farm
laborers, a former Maine statute provided an example in that it covered
only agreements to labor for another in lumbering operations and driving
logs. Me. Laws 1907, c. 7, repealed in Me. Laws 1917, c. 231. It appears as
§ 12, c. 128, in ME. REV. STAT. (1916). "Soon after its passage prosecutions
were commenced in the lumber regions, and the jail at Dover, the county
seat of one of the large lumber counties of Maine, was crowded with
laborers .... [lit soon became known throughout the lumber region of
Maine that any laborer was liable to imprisonment who refused to work ac-
cording to the provisions of his contract until he had settled for all advances,
no matter what misrepresentations may have been made to induce him to
enter the agreement." IMIIGRATION COIiMMISSION REPORTS, op. cit. supra
note 33, at 448, 449.
51. A significant provision of the Maine statute purportedly directed
against fraud in lumber labor was the vesting of jurisdiction in justices of
the peace, rather than the general trial court. Me. Laws 1907, c. 7.
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upon the validity of statutes making a fraudulent promise to
work an element of a crime, even when the statutes are directed
at particular kinds of labor. If an invalid provision on the
statute book can, however, render such a statute void, a show-
ing that this type of legislation is likely to be abused, even
without the invalid presumption, would perhaps have the same
effect.
A system of free labor nevertheless contemplates some legal
pressures not to violate a contract of employment. Apart from
the economic pressures generated by the property system, state
law can enforce contracts for personal service by civil liability
in damages and in exceptional instances by injunction against
performing the same kind of work for another.52 Accordingly,
the Thirteenth Amendment is a shield against state action that
enforces labor for another by means of liability to imprisonment
or the stigma of criminality but not against liability to civil
process operating against interests in property, or economic
assets.
As a sword, the Thirteenth Amendment, through habeas
corpus, entitles the petitioner to freedom as against a custodian
who unlawfully holds him in slavery or involuntarily servitude.
It also empowers Congress to legislate to bring about such free-
dom. Thus Congress assumed federal initiative in the Anti-
peonage Act to strike out against one form of involuntary servi-
tude. The absence of state action is immaterial; any private
person is subject to its liabilities, because the Thirteenth Amend-
ment constitutes a source of federal power to regulate. The out-
lines of what will be held to be peonage are fairly clear by now:
the government must establish that the defendant at least as-
serted a claim of indebtedness by the victim and that he coerced
the victim to work for him to liquidate that debt. The nature of
the coercion depends upon its effect; if it succeeds in over-
coming the victim against his will, it is within the statute. It
may be the abuse of process of arrest, by a trumped-up criminal
charge, or the use of actual private force. Or it may be the fear
of criminal prosecution or deportation, or the fear of violence. A
condition of peonage results from such methods if the victim
52. See HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952); especially pp. 190-196,
but also pp. 5, 30-37, 98-99.
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goes to work under their compulsion. Even if he does not, the
defendant may be liable for arresting a person with the intention
of placing him in or returning him to a condition of peonage.
3. SLAVERY
The basest form of servitude is thus not reached by the Anti-
peonage Act. If there is no claim of indebtedness, there is no
peonage. Hence primitive slavery is not forbidden under its
terms. On March 2, 1807, the permission given to Congress to
prohibit the importation of slaves was exercised, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1808, making violators subject to a forfeiture and in some
instances to imprisonment.5 3 The substance of this legislation
was combined with a prohibition enacted in June 23, 1874,
.against bringing into this country a person kidnaped abroad
with intent to sell him, or selling such a person, or holding a
person so brought or sold in involuntary servitude.' The com-
bination now appears as Section 1584 of the Criminal Code."
This section, unlike its predecessors, prohibits holding any per-
son to involuntary servitude, whereas its immediate predecessors
required that the person be one who had been kidnaped abroad
or sold56 or that the person be one who had been brought in from
abroad as a slave or to be held to service or labor.5 7. The re-en-
actment of these two sections consolidated into one may have
increased the scope of the federal anti-slavery statutes.' 8 In the
meantime, the ]Department of Justice through its Civil Rights
Section had discovered a "Slave Kidnaping Act," which was part
of Reconstruction. 59 In case of doubt about whether assertion of
a claim of indebtedness can be established, 0 this section may be
53. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 9, cl. 1; 2 STAT. 426 (1807).
54. 18 STAT. 251 (1874).
55. "Whoever knowingly and wilfully holds to involuntary servitude or
sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any
-term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18
U.S.C. § 1584 (Supp. III, 1950). The 1874 antecedent of the uection was used
to punish an arrangement to use immigrant children from Italy as beggars
in Chicago. United States v. Ancarola, 1 Fed. 676 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
56. 35 STAT. 1142 (1909).
57. 35 STAT. 1139 (1909).
58. 62 STAT. 773 (1948).
59. 14 STAT. 50 (1866). Its present form is in 18 U.S. C. § 1583 (Supp.
III, 1950). The Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice was
created in 1939. Its early development is recorded in CARR, FEDERAL PRO-
TECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD (1947).
60. In a recent case a circuit judge dissented from affnrance of a con-
viction in four of the six counts of peonage, because he saw no evidence of
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used. It penalizes kidnaping or carrying another away with in-
tent to sell him into involuntary servitude or hold him as a slave,
or enticing or inducing another to board a vessel or to go to any
other place with intent that he may be made or held as a slave or
that he may be sent out of the country to be so made or held.
Two unreported cases were discovered in which the section had
been used to obtain convictions,61 and in United States v. Ingalls,62
the first reported case under the section, a conviction was ob-
tained. Defendant had compelled a woman to accompany her
from Berkeley to Coronado, California. The coercion consisted
of threats to have the woman committed to prison for having
submitted to abortion of a pregnancy incurred as a result of
adultery with defendant's first husband. Defendant also told her
that she was so mentally inferior that she could not make her
way in competitive society and would be committed to an in-
stitution. The judge defined a slave as one who is "wholly sub-
ject to the will of another, one who has no freedom of action and
whose person and services are wholly under the control of an-
other, and who is in a state of enforced compulsory service to
another."133
These statutes constitute the major part of sources of federal
enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment.6 4 The Judicial Code
provides jurisdiction of the district courts for civil actions au-
thorized by law to recover damages for violations of civil rights
and to redress deprivations of constitutional rights under color
indebtedness. Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944) cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945).
61. United States v. Sabbia (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907) and United States v.
Peacher (E.D. Ark. 1937). CARR, op. cit. supra note 59, at 82. See also
note 58 supra. The cases are discussed in Folsom, A Slave Trade Law in a
Contemporary Settiag, 29 CORNELL L. Q. 203, 208, 209 (1943).
62. 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
63. Id. at 78. Other convictions reported by the Attorney General include
a Minnesota case involving a Texan of Mexican descent. REP. Ar'Y GEN.
405 (1949). See also REP. ATT'Y GEN. 175 (1946) and Brodie, The Fed-
erally-Secured Right to be Free from Bondage, 40 GEo. L. J. 367 (1952).
64. Additional examples are cases where the federal courts release per-
sons held in slavery. This jurisdiction operates under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and the habeas corpus powers of the court. An Alaska Indian was so
freed against the contention that Indian slavery constituted an exception
under the Thirteenth Amendment. In re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. 327 (D. Alaska,
1886). In this connection it may be noted that Captain Richard P. Leary,
U.S.N., proclaimed prohibition of "human slavery or peonage" in Guam,
effective February 22, 1900. Proclamation of the Naval Governor of Guam,
January 1, 1900.
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of state law, 5 and the Criminal Code contains similar pro-
visions."6 Authoritative interpretation of these statutes in rela-
tion to the Thirteenth Amendment lies in the future, however.
The scope of the Amendment has been limited by the holding
that "no mere personal assault or trespass or appropriation
operates to reduce the individual to a condition of slavery."' 7 And
the Court called attention to the fact that the certificate alien
Chinese were formerly required to carry in order to establish
their right to remain in the United States had not been contended
to be a badge of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.,8
4. STATE INTERPRETATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Notice Statutes
The state courts have contributed in two directions to the
content of the Thirteenth Amendment. One of them involves the
determination of the validity of a criminal statute requiring
farm laborers or sharecroppers to notify a new employer of the
fact, if such was the case, that they had left the employment or
the leased premises of another before the term had expired. This
statute was in tandem with another statute in Alabama making
it an offense to employ or lease to another after being given such
notice.6 9 After the excoriation of these laws by a federal judge
in his address to the grand jury,0 the Alabama Supreme Court
in the following year held that the notice statute placed uncon-
stitutional restrictions upon the right to make employment con-
tracts and the right to use and cultivate land. 1 The court empha-
sized the fact that arbitrary powers was vested in the employer or
landlord to consent to termination of a contract, that whether the
tenant or employee had a good excuse for leaving could be tested
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. III, 1950). REV. STAT. §§ 1979, 1980 (1875), 8
U.S.C. §§ 43, 47 (1946) provide for civil liability.
66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (Supp. 1951).
67. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 18 (1906).
68. Id. at 19.
69. Ala. Acts 1900-1901, p. 1208. Its predecessor (Ala. Acts 1880-1881,
p. 42) was sustained on the ground that because the interruption of con-
tractual relations between master and servant is tortious if done with
knowledge of their existence, it may be made criminal. Tarpley v. State,
79 Ala. 271 (1885).
70. Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
71. Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120, 37 So. 332, (1904). The criminal prohibi-
tion against hiring a laborer or servant away from another remained valid.
State v. Nix, 165 Ala. 126, 51 So. 754 (1910).
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only by risking a criminal prosecution after the fact, and that
if such notice were given the prospect of obtaining a new em-
ployment or lease would be extremely remote. The Mississippi
analogue 72 was also held invalid.73 The Mississippi Supreme
Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, as did the Alabama
court, but it also mustered the Thirteenth and its equivalent in
the Mississippi Constitution. The "reserve" clause in American
baseball does not require the assistance of such a statute to be
effective, but although it has been said to result in "something
resembling peonage of the baseball player" and because of the
combination that maintains it that "if possible [the contracts]
should be deemed within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act,"
nevertheless it "constitutes no violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment or statutes pursuant thereto. '74
Criminal Enticement
The second contribution by state courts to the content of the
Thirteenth Amendment has been equivocal. On the one hand,
Alabama 75 and Arkansas TM have held that it may be made a
crime to entice a workman away from another employer with
knowledge that the workman has agreed to work for a specified
time. Under Alabama law, however, no evidence of indebtedness
to the first employer can be admitted,77 whereas the Arkansas
statute makes the second employer liable for such debts.7 8 On
the other hand, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held
72. In Miss. Laws 1900, c. 101 it is provided:
Any laborer, renter or share cropper who has contracted with an-
other person for a specified time in writing, not exceeding one year,
who shall leave his employer or leased premises before the expiration of
his contract, without the consent of the employer or landlord, and makes
a second contract with a second party without giving notice of the first
contract to the second party, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on
conviction shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars.
73. State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790, 799, 60 So. 778, 780 (1913): "We can
understand how this statute might be very helpful to the successful opera-
tion of a planting enterprise."
74. Apparently, this is because the player is subject only to contractual
liability and loss of employment opportunity "privately" denied without the
aid of legal machinery. "I may add that, if the players be regarded as
quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well paid.. ." Judge Frank,
concurring, in Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409, 410 (2d Cir. 1949).
75. State v. Nix, 165 Ala. 126, 51 So. 754 (1910) ; Tarpley v. State, 79
Ala. 271 (1885) ; Holland v. State, 29 Ala. App. 181, 194 So. 412 (1940).
76. Johns v. Patterson, 138 Ark. 420, 211 S.W. 387 (1919).
77. Holland v. State, 29 Ala. App. 181, 194 So. 412 (1940).
78. Ark. Acts 1905, p. 726.
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that even civil liability for enticing a servant away or "harboring
him" with knowledge of his contract to work for another is an
infringement of freedom of contract guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. While liability of a worker to pay damages
for breach of his employment contract does not alone amount
to such compulsion as to make his service involuntary, it is in-
voluntary if no one else can employ him. He would be coerced
by the threat of starvation scarcely less than if he were under
threat of criminal punishment7 9 The dissent complained that
this position is in advance of federal law and in regulating the
relations between employers it goes too far.
5. EXCEPTIONS TO THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Thirteenth Amendment in general provides protection
against statutes that coerce labor for private persons by threat
of imprisonment or criminal liability and authorizes the federal
legislation that punishes peonage and slavery, whether with or
without the aid of the action or legislation of the states. In
addition, state courts by authority of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, in some instances supplemented by the Fourteenth, have
struck down statutes having the effect of holding the worker to
his job, either by requiring him to tell a prospective new em-
ployer of his contract for previous employment or by prohibit-
ing a new employer from inducing or contributing to the breach
of such contract. There are, however, exceptions to the pro-
hibition of the Thirteenth Amendment against involuntary servi-
tude.
Convicts
One of the express exceptions to the prohibition against invol-
untary servitude is punishment for crime. It has been held that
the exception extends to violation of police regulations of a
municipality, when the convict was required to work out a hun-
dred dollar fine by imprisonment of six months. 80 Chain gang
labor can be imposed for violation of a city ordinance, even with-
out a jury trial, but it was held a violation of due process to
commit the prisoner to work with felons under punishment of the
79. Shaw v. Fisher, 113 S.C. 287, 102 S.E. 325 (1920). See the prohibi-
tion in the Federal Criminal Code that makes it a misdemeanor to entice a
workman to violate his contract to work in an armory or arsenal. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1232 (Supp. III, 1950).
80. Chicago v. Williams, 254 Ill. 360, 98 N.E. 666 (1912). (The rate was
fifty cents a day, but there was a six months maximum.)
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same grade of severity.,, The Nebraska constitutional prohibition
of slavery and involuntary servitude was held to render invalid
the imposition of hard labor as punishment for contempt of an
injunction, though imprisonment was allowed to stand.82
Military Service
An unwritten exception is compulsory military and naval
service. The authority for this exception contains by way of
explanation only the unilluminating observation of Mr. Chief
Justice White, addressed to the contention that such service is
involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment,
"the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement."'13
Road Work
The basis for this kind of exception was outlined with some
care by Mr. Justice McReynolds in Butler v. Perry." The Thir-
teenth Amendment introduced no novel doctrine with respect to
services always treated as exceptional. It certainly did not inter-
dict the enforcement of duties owed to the state, such as service
in the army, the militia, or on the jury. 5 The point at issue was
whether able-bodied males between 21 and 45 years of age could
be required to work on the road for a week (of sixty hours)
during the year, under a Florida statute making failure to com-
ply a crime. The Court sustained the statute on the basis of
ancient usage and unanimous judicial opinion, 6 pointing to the
existence of similar statutes requiring work on the roads under
the Northwest Ordinance, from which the Thirteenth Amendment
was taken, and referring to Blackstone's trinoda necessitas.
87
81. Pearsons v. Wimbish, 124 Ga. 701, 52 S.E. 751 (1906).
82. Smolczyk v. Gaston, 147 Neb. 681, 24 N.W.2d 862 (1946).
83. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). In connection
with camps for conscientious objectors in lieu of military duty it was ex-
plained that the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to a call for service
made by the government according to law to meet a public need. Inciden-
tally, the rate of allowances is immaterial, because involuntary, not uncom-
pensated service is forbidden. Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798 (5th Cir.
1944).
84. 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
85. Compulsory service for the public in various capacities has been sus-
tained. State v. Henley, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S.W. 352 (1897) (witnesses and
certain officers in criminal cases); Crews v. Lundquist, 361 Ill. 193, 197 N.E.
768 (1935) (service as administrator for estates of war veterans).
86. E.g., Shoat v. State, 80 Md. 392 31 Atl. 322 (1895) (road work stat-
ute does not infringe the privileges and immunities of citizens of the state);
Dennis v. Simon, 51 Ohio St. 233, 36 N.E. 832 (1894).
87. 1 BL. COMM. 263, 357.
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Seamen
Ancient wont was employed to justify compulsion to serve in
an earlier case which listed as traditional exceptions military
and naval enlistments and the custody of minor children and
wards. In Robertson v. Baldwin88 the validity of federal stat-
utes89 providing for the arrest of seamen and their return to
their ships to serve out the period for which they had signed
to sail was challenged. Mr. Justice Brown, for the Court, sus-
tained the statutes as falling within unwritten traditional ex-
ceptions. He suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment is to be
read as are the first ten amendments to the Constitution, which
have always been subject to the exceptions understood to exist
at their adoption though not expressed. This approach, however,
was only in the alternative; the opinion of the majority first
holds that the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to any
compulsion to remain in service entered into voluntarily. Con-
tracts for personal servitude, it was said, may be void as against
public policy, but they do not violate the prohibition against
involuntary servitude!
That this view of the law was not to stand was shown eight
years later in Clyatt v. United States,0 which upheld the Anti-
Peonage Act as a valid exercise of Congressional power under
the Thirteenth Amendment and held that it embraces involun-
tary service whether entered into voluntarily or involuntarily.
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Robertson v.,Baldwin.'1 was thus
vindicated. He considered that the ancient laws referred to by
the majority were no longer apposite, in view of subsequent
constitutional development. He emphasized the facts that the
vessel was engaged in a purely private business and that the
Thirteenth Amendment plainly provides only for one exception,
punishment for crime. He also dissented from the reasoning
that service voluntarily entered could not become involuntary
servitude during the term of the agreement. He conceded, how-
ever, that there are unwritten exceptions for public service, as
in the case of soldiers and sailors, and even in private service,
but only in the instance of apprentices of tender years. Though
88. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
89. Rav. STAT. §§ 4598, 4599 (1875). This statute was repealed a year
after the decision in favor of a milder seamen's code. 30 STAT. 764 (1898).
90. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
91. 165 U.S. 275, 288 (1897).
FORCED LABOR
the Clyatt case cut from under the holding in the Robertson case
a substantial line of reasoning, the Robertson case has not been
overruled and presumably still stands on the ground that seamen,
by unwritten exception based on tradition, can be compelled to
continue a voyage once begun.92
Children
One clear-cut exception, in addition to whatever remains of
the seaman exception, exists in favor of compulsory service in
behalf of a private master, although its importance as a source
of forced labor is slight. That is the exception in favor of ap-
prenticeship of minors. The principle is that the state as parens
patriae safeguards the welfare of children who are neglected by
their parents and as an incident of assuming custody of them
may require them to perform services appropriate to their age
and condition, or may authorize a private person to do so 93
Vagrants
This principle would extend to mental defectives of mature
chronological age if they are without means of subsistence, or
if they have to be restrained as a measure of public safety. But
difficulties arise when the state undertakes to compel private
service solely because of destitution or idleness. A procedure
for hiring vagrants out to the highest bidder for a half-year
term was held to be a violation of the state and federal prohibi-
92. Cf. Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31 (1942). When
Chinese seamen were not permitted to land in the United States, the court
on habeas corpus was compelled to dispense a kind of natural equity. The
captain, while the ship was in Tacoma, Washington, was threatening to
violate the terms of the shipping articles of the crew by returning to Manila
with a load of military supplies instead of going directly to Hong Kong.
Since Hong Kong is on the route from Tacoma, and the expense of shipping
the men on another vessel would be very heavy, the court ordered the sea-
men remanded to the custody of the captain and accepted the bond of the
captain either to arrangee for their return from Manila to Hong Kong or to
return immediately from Manila on his own ship. This doom of Solomon
doubtless left the Chinese with a bitter taste, because they clearly desired to
avoid the hazards of service in the war zone. In re Chung Fat, 96 Fed. 202(N.D. Wash. 1899). A more recent case awarded damages for false im-
prisonment, when the master, by contesting a petition for habeas corpus,
prolonged his custody of seamen after they obtained permission of the im-
migration authorities to land. Elman v. Moller, 11 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1926),
cert. denied, 271 U.S. 675 (1926).
93. Garner v. Wood, 188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137 (1939); Kennedy v.
Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906) ; Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118
So. 184 (1928).
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tions against involuntary servitude94 A vagrant was not de-
nominated a criminal by the statute, which defined vagrants as
able-bodied persons who have no visible means of support, or
who do not work and are found loitering about, or who leave
their wives and children without means of subsistence, or who
are found begging.
A less archaic method of compelling men to work was used
during the First World War. Such statutes required all male
persons within designated ages to be engaged in some lawful
occupation. Under the Delaware plan, if the person was not so
engaged he was obliged, on pain of being held guilty of a crime,
to accept assignment by the State Council of Defense to a private
employer. The statute was sustained as a reasonable means of
preventing an increase in crime and increasing production. 5
After war, depression of business activity left its mark on
the use of coercion by the criminal law to. obtain labor. In
Commonwealth v. Pouiot8 the defendant was convicted of un-
reasonable neglect to provide for the support of his family. He
was able-bodied but unable to find private employment. He could
have, however, made his family eligible for benefits dispensed
by the welfare department of the city by working for the city
public works department as required. The court denied his
contention that he was entitled to decline to work unless the city
would assign a definite rate of compensation for his services.
Officers of the city may be required to perlorm their duties law-
fully and without oppression. The duty of family support may
be enforced by criminal sanctions. Their use in connection with
this means of obtaining support is analogous to jury duty, ok
duty in the militia, so far as the Thirteenth Amendment is con-
cerned. This last assertion of the court is unsound, since the
duty to serve here reflects family obligations rather than civil
obligations to organized society. Nevertheless, so long as the
family head is constrained by economic need, rather than by
absolute legal compulsion, to perform the service in question,
and so long as he is legally free to employ whatever resources
he may be able to muster, it seems that giving him an oppor-
tunity to satisfy his obligations is not an invasion of constitu-
94. Thompson v. Bunton, 117 Mo. 83, 22 S.W. 863 (1893).
95. State v. McClure, 7 Boyce 265, 105 Atl. 712 (Del. 1919). Contra: Ex
parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920).
96. 292 Mass. 229, 198 N.E. 256 (1935).
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tional rights. Like the property system, family-support statutes
may bring about the necessity to labor, and even to labor in a
particular employment (whether public or private); but the
economic circumstances that contribute to this necessity do not
afford a justification for exemption from a duty applicable alike
in all economic circumstances, the duty to use from whatever
resources there are an amount sufficient to care for the family.
On the other hand, it may be doubted whether a general duty
to engage in an occupation, at least without a general draft for
public service under the justification of wartime necessity or
other disaster emergency,9 7 is consistent with traditional notions
of liberty. Certainly a general compulsion to work for a par-
ticular private employer under criminal sanctions, or perhaps a
tax on changing employers, would be offensive to the Thirteenth
Amendment. No less offensive to the Fourteenth, it seems to
me, would be the general deprivation by direct compulsion of a
criminal statute of the liberty not to work based upon economic
status. Yet vagrancy statutes are frequently so vaguely phrased
as to be susceptible of application through a means test. Temp-
tation of officers to make such use of the ordinances against
vagrancy is ever-present, because of the disproportionate amount
of pains required to apprehend petty criminals on lawful evi-
dence. When labor is in great demand this temptation is intensi-
fied. It is not uncommon for the streets in town to be empty of
idlers during harvest season or in levee towns in the flood season
as a result of police department drives on "vagrancy."
6. SUMMARY
The promise of the Thriteenth Amendment, that neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United
States, is a national pledge that has been one of the minor ob-
jects of legislative and judicial concern. Nevertheless, after
1900 an obscure statute enacted primarily to curb abuses of
military authority in a remote province became a lever against
bondage, and has served as the primary national force against
involuntary pservitude to the present day. It removes the barrier
against migration of a worker that keeps him by unlawful
means in his current service to satisfy an asserted indebtedness
97. See Hoague, Brown, and Marcus, Wartime Conscription and Control
of Labor, 54 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1940).
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to his employer. It opposes to that unlawful means a liability to
punishment as a felon. Further, that statute, in conjunction with
the Thirteenth Amendment,'has contributed to the invalidation
of legislation that enables an employer to hold over the head of
his employee the risk of criminal liability for leaving an em-
ployment. A few decisions of state courts have removed addi-
tional clogs on freedom to leave an employment.
It has become clear that criminal liability cannot be directly
imposed upon failure to carry out a contract of employment, nor
can a state expose an employee to the risk of such liability by a
rule of presumption based upon leaving an employment. Stat-
utes that readily lend themselves to abuse for the purpose of
maintaining service under threat of criminal prosecution are
suspect.
If service may not be maintained without the consent of the
employee, neither can it be so imposed. But here it has been
necessary to note the exceptions for criminal punishment, the
public services such as military and naval obligations, shipboard
discipline, and the custody of children. Subject to these excep-
tions, any obligation to go to work for a particular employer or to
remain in his service can only be a resultant of the coincidence
of limited economic opportunity with duties such as support of
the family that are properly enforceable by the criminal law
or with duties that are sanctioned only by liability to respond
in damages.
The enforcement of a duty backed up by criminal liability
either to work for some employer or to be self-employed in a
remunerative occupation could produce involuntary servitude and
trench upon the freedom to migrate for employment. The nearest
approximation to the enforcement of such a duty is the manner
in which vagrancy ordinances are from time to time enforced.
This problem is the more acute because the abusive enforcement
of vagrancy ordinances, like the use of laws against fraudulently
obtaining advances from an employer, bears most heavily upon
persons who lack the resources to resist their erroneous or op-
pressive administration.
The social interest in stability of employment cannot be en-
forced by direct regulation freezing men to their jobs, short of
dire emergency or conversion to a quasi-military mobilization
of resources and manpower. So long as workers have the means
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of transportation they are generally free to migrate for em-
ployment, and counterpressures must be found in the superior
attractions of remaining at the chosen employment, since igno-
rance of better opportunity elsewhere cannot be depended upon
to prevail. Prevention and correction of misinformation about
employment opportunity, and, to the extent consistent with other
policies, equalization of employment conditions over the country,
are, however, examples of spheres of action outside the area
where direct measures to hold a worker to his job are forbidden.
